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1STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In addition to its renowned search and email services, Google also provides
advertising services to websites, like the Viacom Nickelodeon websites at issue in
this multi-district litigation (“MDL”). While website operators typically generate
much of the content displayed to visitors of their sites, many employ advertising
services like those that Google offers to deliver ads to their visitors. Viacom is one
such website operator.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Google challenge its use of the Internet “cookies”
that help Google to provide advertising services to Viacom. Cookies are small text
files transmitted between a server and a user’s Internet browser to promote
convenience and customization on the Internet. Cookies are standard fare on the
Internet, and for almost 15 years, have been used by innumerable companies to
provide beneficial services to consumers. Google uses the “DoubleClick ID”
cookie, introduced over a decade ago, in an effort to deliver more relevant ads to
users of Viacom’s website. Google could never have placed these cookies if it had
not been invited by Viacom to do so.
Plaintiffs contend that Google’s use of the DoubleClick cookie violates their
privacy by collecting Plaintiffs’ information. But Plaintiffs’ own allegations betray
their claim that Google uses the DoubleClick cookie to collect their information.
The allegations show that (1) Plaintiffs, through their browsers, voluntarily send
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2the information directly to Google, and (2) they do so whether or not cookies are
present on their browsers, in the ordinary operation of the Internet. Master
Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Dkt. 42, (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 24-31, 39-44, 78,
80, 139, 140. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs have alleged no facts showing Google
receipt of this information causes them any harm, and they therefore fail to
establish Article III standing. But even if Plaintiffs could overcome that hurdle,
their own allegations highlight the fundamental disconnect in their case: there is
no causal link between the conduct at issue (Google’s alleged use of cookies) and
the harm Plaintiffs claim (Google’s alleged receipt of information). Because
Google’s conduct did not cause Plaintiffs any harm, they lack Article III standing
and their claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
To the extent Plaintiffs seek to rely on a theory of statutory standing, they
fare no better because they have failed to state any plausible claim for relief under
the statutes they assert. Courts have time and again rejected the claims asserted by
Plaintiffs as a matter of law, including in two prior MDL’s specifically addressing
use of Google’s Doubleclick ID cookie. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie
Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727 (D. Del. Oct.
9, 2013) (“Cookie Litig.”) (currently on appeal)(granting motion to dismiss federal
and state privacy claims against use and operation of Doubleclick cookie); In re
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(same); Low
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3v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022-32 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing
SCA and state-law claims challenging LinkedIn’s use of cookies); In re Facebook
Privacy Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147345, at *4-20 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011)
(dismissing Wiretap Act, Stored Communications Act, and state-law claims);
LaCourt v. Specific Media, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543, at *7-21 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 28, 2011) (dismissing federal and state claims).
Google respectfully requests that the action be dismissed in its entirety for
lack of Article III standing and for failure to state a claim.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing
Google’s alleged placement of cookies on Plaintiffs’ browsers did not cause
them any cognizable injury. Plaintiffs’ browsers voluntarily send information to
Google in the ordinary operation of the Internet and do so whether or not a cookie
is present on their browsers. If a cookie is present on a user’s browser, it changes
only one thing: the browser sends the cookie value to Google along with the same
information it would otherwise send. The cookie value is an alphanumeric number
automatically set by Google that contains no personal information about the user.
It merely allows Google to associate prior information sent to it by the same
browser, thereby enabling Google to display more relevant ads to that browser.
While Plaintiffs’ Complaint is particularly muddy on this point, the only
“injury” they claim is that Google profited from this practice. Compl. ¶¶ 49-59.
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4But as a matter of law, alleging a benefit to the defendant as opposed to a
cognizable harm to themselves is insufficient to establish standing. Because
Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing that they were harmed through
Google’s use of the DoubleClick cookie to serve them more relevant ads, the case
should be dismissed for lack of standing.
B. Each of Plaintiffs’ Claims Fails As A Matter Of Law Because
Plaintiffs Do Not Allege Basic Elements Of Their Claims
Plaintiffs do not allege any viable claim for relief:
 The Wiretap Act (Count II) prohibits intentional interception of the
contents of communications by persons who are not parties to the communication.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). Plaintiffs claim that Google used the DoubleClick
cookie to intercept their communications, but are deliberately vague about which
communications were intercepted. That is no accident. The only communications
Google obtains by having a cookie on a user’s browser are communications
between the browser and the computers Google uses to serve advertisements. See
Compl., ¶¶ 24-31, 39-44, 78, 80, 139-140. Google is a party to those
communications and therefore cannot be charged with improperly intercepting
them under the Wiretap Act or related state law (Counts II and IV). Those claims
fail for the additional reason that only the “contents” of a communication, i.e.,
“information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of th[e]
communication” is protected. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); Cal. Penal Code § 631.
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5Google did not receive the contents of any communication due to the presence of
DoubleClick cookies on a user’s browser; it received only the cookie value it
assigned to that browser.
 The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) (Count III) prohibits
intentionally accessing without authorization “a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided” to obtain electronic
communications “in electronic storage.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). It is intended to
protect electronic communications stored by third party communications services.
This claim fails because (i) Plaintiffs allege that the communications at issue were
obtained while in transit, not in “storage”; (ii) their own computers do not
constitute “facilities” under the SCA; and (iii) Plaintiffs voluntarily sent their
communications to Google; Google did not access them “without authorization.”
 The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) (Count I) prohibits
knowing disclosures by a “video tape service provider” (“VTSP”) of “information
that identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials”
(“PII”) from a VTSP. Plaintiffs’ VPPA disclosure claim fails because (i) Plaintiffs
do not allege that Google is a VTSP; and (ii) Plaintiffs do not allege facts showing
that Google disclosed Plaintiffs’ PII to anyone. The VPPA also prohibits VTSP’s
from retaining PII for more than a year longer than necessary. Plaintiffs’ VPPA
retention claim fails because (i) Google is not a VTSP; (ii) it did not receive
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6Plaintiffs’ PII; (iii) there is no private cause of action for a retention claim; and (iv)
Plaintiffs allege no facts showing Google retained their PII longer than necessary.
 The New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act (“CROA”) Claim
(Count V) fails because (i) Plaintiffs were not “damaged in business or property”;
(ii) Google did not purposefully or knowingly harm Plaintiffs; and (iii) Plaintiffs
do not allege facts to satisfy the elements of any subsection of the CROA.
 The “intrusion” claim (Count VI) fails because (i) assuming
counterfactually that placing cookies on Plaintiffs’ browsers was unlawful
(contrary to all precedent), Plaintiffs allege no facts showing that Google knew and
intended such illegality; (ii) Google obtained no private information; and (iii) the
alleged intrusion was not highly offensive because cookies are standard, well-
known, and fundamental to the provision of countless Internet services.
 The unjust enrichment claim (Count VII) fails because (i) Plaintiffs do
not invoke the law of any jurisdiction; and (ii) unjust enrichment is not a cause of
action under California law and fails to state a claim under New Jersey law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Ubiquitous Use Of Cookies On The Internet
Internet “cookies” are small text files that are transmitted between a website
and an Internet browser. Compl. ¶ 33; Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145727, at *4. “Cookies are widely used on the Internet by reputable websites to
promote convenience and customization.” In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 14
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7(1st Cir. 2003); see Compl. ¶¶ 34, 35, 37; Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v.
ValueClick, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“[T]oday the
‘cookies’ technology is ubiquitous, and plays a large role in Internet users’ Web
browsing.”); DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (service created to serve tailored
ads using cookies over twelve years ago). Cookies allow websites to retain the
contents of users’ online shopping carts, keep users logged into sites between
visits, and store users’ preferences. Pharmatrack, 329 F.3d at 14. Cookies are
useful for Internet advertising because they allow for the display of more relevant
ads to browsers. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 38, 39, 47, 48, 69, 71.
B. Plaintiffs’ Browsers Send Information To Google Through GET
Commands, Whether Or Not A Cookie Is Present
Plaintiffs’ Complaint describes how their browsers send information to
Google, even in the absence of cookies, so that Google can provide advertising
services to websites by displaying ads to Plaintiffs when they visit those websites.
See generally id. ¶¶ 24-31, 39-44, 78, 80, 139, 140. 1
Each website on the Internet is hosted by a computer server. Compl. ¶ 25.
To access a website, people use browsers to communicate with these servers. Id.
¶¶ 24-25. When a web address, known as a Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”)
1 Google accepts the allegations as true only for purposes of this motion to
dismiss, and would dispute many of them if the case were to continue.
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8such as “www.cnn.com,” is entered into a browser’s address bar, the browser
submits a “GET” command to the website seeking all content displayed on the site.
Id. ¶¶ 26, 27, 46. This GET command includes certain information generated by
the browser that enables the website to display the correct content. See id. ¶¶ 27,
31; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503 (“This communication may contain data
submitted as part of the request, such as a query string or field information.”).
If the website wishes to display an ad, the website will instruct the browser
to send a separate GET command to an ad service. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 31, 40, 46.
Where the ad service is Google, the browser voluntarily sends a GET command to
Google. The GET command contains information generated by the browser
necessary to ensure that the correct ad is displayed. See DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp.
2d at 503. Plaintiffs allege that the GET command transmits information,
including the URL of the page that the user is visiting and other “personal
information.” See Compl. ¶ 42 (“In many cases, the third party receives the re-
directed “GET” request and a copy of the user’s request to the first-party website
before the content of the initial request from the first-party webpage appears on the
user’s screen.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 139 (alleging “[t]he specific Uniform
Resource Locators the Plaintiffs typed into and sent through their web browsers
are ‘contents’. . .” ) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 140 (asserting legal conclusion that
URL “is content because . . . . it identifies the exact title of the video shown on the
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9communication requested and received by the Internet user from Viacom”); see
also id. ¶¶ 24-31, 39-41, 43-44, 78, 177. This information, including the URL, is
transmitted to Google by the user’s browser, whether or not a cookie is present on
the user’s browser. See Compl. ¶¶ 24-31, 39-44, 78, 80, 139, 140; Cookie Litig.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *15 (“plaintiffs’ browsers voluntarily sent to
Google the information inputted by plaintiffs [as part of the GET command],
regardless of whether plaintiffs’ browsers had any Google cookies set”); id. at *16
(“[P]laintiffs’ browsers would send a URL [to Google as part of the GET
command] regardless of whether a third party cookie was set.”).
Google responds to this GET command by selecting and sending an ad for
display in the browser. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 44. An ad will be displayed to the user
whether or not a cookie is present on the user’s browser. Id. ¶¶ 28-31, 39-44. If a
DoubleClick cookie is not already present and the browser is configured to accept
cookies, a cookie may be placed on the browser. See id. ¶¶ 45, 46, 73, 74.
C. DoubleClick Cookies Allow Google To Send More Relevant Ads
If a DoubleClick cookie is present on a browser that visits a webpage that
displays a Google ad, the cookie value – the alphanumeric number assigned to
Plaintiffs’ browser by Google – is sent by the browser to Google as part of the
GET command. See id. ¶¶ 45, 47, 48; Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 14 (“A cookie is a
piece of information sent by a web server to a web browser that the browser
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software is expected to save and to send back whenever the browser makes
additional requests of the server.”). Plaintiffs do not allege that any additional or
different information is sent from their browsers to Google in the GET command
when a cookie is present, other than the cookie value itself.
The string of text that makes up the DoubleClick cookie value does not
include the contents of any communication. It is merely an “alphanumeric
identifier” unrelated to the communication it accompanies. See Compl. ¶¶ 47, 98;
see also DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 513. The cookie value allows Google to
present more relevant ads to the browser at the next page the browser visits that
employs Google’s ad services. See Compl. ¶¶ 35, 47. 48, 69, 77, 82, 83, 94;
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 505; see also Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145727, at *4-5; Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 14. Google can recognize the
browser from the cookie value, and tailor ads based on prior experiences of the
browser’s user(s). Compl. ¶¶ 37-39, 47, 48, 69, 71, 84; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp.
2d at 503.
D. User Information Collected by Viacom Is Unknown to Google
Plaintiffs contend that Viacom collects birth date and gender information
from visitors to its Nickelodeon websites who register and establish profiles with
them. Compl. ¶85-86. Plaintiffs allege that Viacom assigns internal codes (called
the “rugrat coding”) to its users based on their age and gender. Id., ¶¶ 88-89. But
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Plaintiffs admit that to the extent this information is provided to Google, it is in
coded form. Id., ¶¶ 93, 98, 99. They do not allege that Google is aware of the
information, much less that Google understands Viacom’s internal “rugrat” codes.
E. The Complaint and The Named Plaintiffs
This multi-district litigation comprises six federal civil actions filed against
Viacom and Google, all of which were transferred to this Court. Dkt. 31. The
named plaintiffs are all under the age of thirteen and allege that they were
registered users of at least one of the following Viacom websites: Nick.com,
NickJr.com, and NeoPets.com. Id. They claim that when they visited these sites,
Google placed cookies on their browsers without their consent. Plaintiffs assert
various federal and state claims, seeking to represent a putative class.2
ARGUMENT
I. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(1)
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING
The action should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) because Plaintiffs have
not suffered an Article III injury. A suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III
2 The class is defined as “[a]ll children under the age of 13 in the United States
who visited the websites Nick.com, NickJr.com, and/or NeoPets.com, and had
Internet cookies that tracked their Internet communications placed on their
computing devices by Viacom and Google.” A subclass is defined as “[a]ll
children under the age of 13 in the United States who were registered users of
Nick.com, NickJr.com, and/or NeoPets.com, who engaged with one or more
video materials on such site(s), and who had their video viewing histories
knowingly disclosed by Viacom to Google.” Compl. ¶ 103.
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standing does not meet the Constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement. Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 109-110 (1998). “[T]o satisfy
Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an
‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (2000). The plaintiff
“bears the burden of establishing that he has Article III standing for each type of
relief sought.” ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 301 (3d Cir. 2012).
In putative class actions alleging supposed privacy violations, court after
court has found there to be no Article III injury where a plaintiff makes nothing
more than the type of general allegations Plaintiffs make here. Compl. ¶¶ 49-59.3
3 A host of these cases involve allegations of supposedly nefarious cookie
use. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
171124, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“Google Privacy Litig. II”) (“injury-in-
fact in this context requires more than an allegation that a defendant profited from
a plaintiff’s personal identification information”); Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145727, at *8, 10 (allegations that personal information “has value to third-
party companies” does not “equate . . . to injury in fact”); In re Google Inc.
Privacy Policy Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183041, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28,
2012) (“Google Privacy Policy Litig. I”) (the law does not confer “standing on a
party that has brought statutory or common law claims based on nothing more than
the unauthorized disclosure of personal information”); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., No.:
(continued...)
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For example in LaCourt, plaintiffs accused an online advertising network of using
cookies to track their Internet use without consent. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543,
at *2-4. The court held plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not alleged (1)
that any named plaintiff was actually harmed, or (2) any “particularized” injury.
Plaintiffs’ resort to abstract concepts like “opportunity costs” were insufficient. Id.
at *7-15. Similarly, in Del Vecchio I, plaintiffs accused Amazon.com of placing
cookies on their browsers “against their wishes.” 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138314,
at *3. Plaintiffs asserted that use of cookies to obtain their information caused
them “‘economic harms,’ including “loss of the economic value of the
information.” Id. at *4. The court dismissed the case for failure to plead facts
demonstrating “any plausible harm.” Id. at *22.
Plaintiffs’ counsel are no strangers to this extensive body of law. They
briefed (and lost) this precise issue in Cookie Litig. There, as here, plaintiffs
alleged they suffered an injury by Google’s placement of DoubleClick cookies on
(...continued from previous page)
11-CV-01468, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130840, at *10-15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11,
2011) (dismissing for lack of standing claims that relied on general allegations that
consumer information is valuable); LaCourt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543, at *12
(same); Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138314, at *10
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2011) (“Del Vecchio I”) (“While it may be theoretically
possible that Plaintiffs’ information could lose value as a result of its collection and
use by Defendant, Plaintiffs do not plead any facts from which the Court can
reasonably infer that such devaluation occurred in this case.”); In re JetBlue
Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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their browsers, asserting that the cookies enabled Google to collect their “personal
information.” 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *7-12. Plaintiffs “cite[d] to
many articles to support their allegations that personally identifiable information
(‘PII’) has monetary value and is a commodity that companies trade and sell.” Id.
at *7-8. The court held plaintiffs lacked standing because they had “not
sufficiently alleged that the ability to monetize their PII has been diminished or lost
by virtue of Google’s previous collection of it.” Id. at *10-11.
That reasoning applies with equal force here. Plaintiffs cite articles to try to
show that online personal information has monetary value. Compl. ¶¶ 49-59. But
such allegations have repeatedly been found insufficient as a matter of law. E.g.,
Cookies Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *8; Low, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130840, at *10-15; LaCourt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543, at *12; Del Vecchio I,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138314, at *10. Plaintiffs do not allege facts to show their
ability to monetize their personal information was diminished. They do not allege
that they attempted to sell their information or were unable to do so because of
Google. Thus, they do not establish an actual concrete injury.
Plaintiffs not only fail to establish actual injury, they also fail to state a
plausible violation of any statute that might confer statutory standing. While it is
by no means clear that plaintiffs who have suffered no injury-in-fact can bring a
claim under the Wiretap Act, SCA or VPPA, it is clear that they must, at a
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minimum, state a claim under those statutes to be able to invoke a theory of
statutory standing. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (Wiretap Act standing requires
facts showing plaintiffs’ communications were “intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of [the Wiretap Act]”); 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (SCA
standing requires facts showing plaintiffs were “aggrieved by any violation of
[the SCA]”); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1) (VPPA standing requires facts showing
plaintiffs were “aggrieved by any act of a person in violation of this section”);
e.g., Sterk v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150872, at *16-17
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2012) (“plaintiff must plead [both] an injury [and] a statutory
violation to meet the standing requirement of Article III [for an SCA claim and a
VPPA claim]”). As shown below in connection with our Rule 12(b)(6) argument,
Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under any of the federal statutes they assert.
Because they have not alleged injury-in-fact or established statutory standing, the
action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 12(B)(6)
FOR FAILURE AND INABILITY TO STATE A CLAIM
A. Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed when it “fail[s] to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[O]nly a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist.,
Case 2:12-cv-07829-SRC-CLW   Document 44-1   Filed 01/15/14   Page 25 of 50 PageID: 364
16
706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013). “Threadbare recitals of the elements . . . do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must “disregard ‘naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d
121, 131 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, while the Court accepts as true all material
allegations, it need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted
inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678-79; Santiago, 629 F.3d at 131-133. Because Plaintiffs have not stated
a viable claim against Google, the action should also be dismissed for failure to
state a claim.
B. The Wiretap Claim (Count II) Should Be Dismissed
The Wiretap Act (a) protects only against intentional interception of a
communication by persons who are not parties to that communication, and (b) only
applies where the contents of the communication were improperly intercepted.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 523 (2001); United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d
900, 916 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the only communications Plaintiffs identify as
potentially intercepted by Google were GET commands sent from Plaintiffs’
browsers to Google. See Compl. ¶¶ 30, 31, 40, 46.4 Plaintiff therefore have no
4 Plaintiffs also allege that Google intercepted “Plaintiffs’ communications
with the Viacom children’s websites.” Compl., ¶ 154. But Plaintiffs do not
identify any such communications or otherwise provide factual support for this
(continued...)
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viable Wiretap Act claim because (1) Google is a party to the communications and
thus cannot be held liable for unlawful interception, and (2) the only information
Google received from Plaintiffs due to the placement of cookies were the cookie
values themselves, which are not protected “contents.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
1. Google Was A Party To The Communications
It is not unlawful for a “party to the communication” to receive the
communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). Google was a party to any plausible
“communication” here because the exchange of information was in the form of
GET commands sent from Plaintiffs’ browsers to Google. As Plaintiffs allege:
Upon receiving a GET command from a child’s web browser, the website
host server contemporaneously instructs the child’s web browser to send
other GET commands to other servers responsible for filling in the blank
parts of the web page.
(...continued from previous page)
conclusory allegation (and to the contrary, only identify communications sent
directly from Plaintiff to Google, see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 30, 31, 40, 46). The allegation is
therefore properly disregarded. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But even if Google were
not a party to the communications, and instead had intercepted communications
between Plaintiffs and the Viacom websites, Plaintiffs would still not state a
Wiretap Act claim. The websites that Plaintiffs allegedly visit were also parties
to the communications with Plaintiffs’ browsers, and those websites have
authorized Google’s access to the communications. Compl., ¶¶ 38-42, 74, 97,
128. This prior consent defeats an interception claim. See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d);
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 510, 514 (“DoubleClick affiliated Web sites are
‘parties to the communication[s]’ from [browsers] and have given sufficient
consent to DoubleClick to intercept them.”).
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Compl. ¶ 30 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 24-29, 31, 39-44, 78, 80, 139-140.
Plaintiffs’ browsers send the GET commands to Google in the ordinary operation
of the Internet because the GET commands contain information Google needs to
display ads. See Compl. ¶¶ 25-27, 30-31, 40-44; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at
503. They send the GET commands whether or not DoubleClick cookies are
present. See Compl. ¶¶ 24-31, 39-44, 78, 80, 139, 140; Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *15-16. And according to Plaintiffs, it is the GET
commands that contain the “personal information” at issue, including the URLs of
websites. See Compl. ¶¶ 78, 80, 139-40, 177. Because Google cannot “intercept”
communications Plaintiffs send directly to it, their claim fails. See, e.g., Goode v.
Goode, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3124, at *8 (D. Del. Mar. 14, 2000).
To try to avoid dismissal of their Wiretap Act claim on the ground that they
voluntarily send the information at issue directly to Google, Plaintiffs seek to
invoke an exception under the Act, which permits parties to communications to be
held liable if they intercept the communications “for the purpose of committing a[]
criminal or tortious act.” Compl. ¶¶ 153-54; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). But
Plaintiffs misunderstand this narrow exception. It applies only “if [the interception
was] made ‘with an unlawful motive,’ such as ‘blackmailing the other party,
threatening him, or publicly embarrassing him.’” Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94,
99 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs would therefore need to allege that
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Google had “as [its] objective a tortious or criminal result,” id. at 100 (emphasis
added),5 and that the tortious or criminal act was “independent of the intentional
act” of interception. Id. (emphasis added); Berk v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143510 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011).
Plaintiffs’ own allegations demonstrate the inapplicability of this exception,
as Plaintiffs concede that Google’s purpose was to provide a valued service to
commercial websites, and not to perpetuate a tort or crime. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 2
(“[U]nique and specific electronic identifying information and content about each
of these children was accessed, stored, and utilized for commercial purposes.”)
(emphasis added); DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (rejecting application of
criminal purpose exception where use of DoubleClick cookie was to “execut[e] a
highly-publicized market-financed business model in pursuit of commercial gain”).
While Plaintiffs also assert that “the [D]efendants’ actions were done for criminal
purposes in violation of numerous federal and state statutes, including, but not
limited to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
[“CFAA”]” (Compl. ¶ 154) and that “Defendants’ actions were done for the
5 See also Sussman v. American Broad. Cos., 186 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (9th Cir.
1999) (“Where the purpose is not illegal or tortious, but the means are, the
victims must seek redress elsewhere”); DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (“[A]
plaintiff cannot establish that a defendant acted with a ‘criminal or tortious’
purpose simply by proving that the defendant committed any tort or crime.”).
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tortious purpose of intruding upon the Plaintiffs’ seclusion as set forth in this
Complaint” (Id. ¶ 153), those allegations are mere “formulaic recitation[s]”
without support. They are properly ignored. 6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2. Google Did Not Intercept Any “Contents”
Plaintiffs’ claim must be dismissed for the additional reason that they do not
allege that Google intercepted the “contents” of their communications. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4) (defining “intercept”); § 2511(1); Walsh v. Krantz, 386 F. App’x 334,
338-339 (3d Cir. 2010); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-
114 (3d Cir. 2004). “Contents” is defined to cover only “information concerning
the substance, purport, or meaning of” the communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8);
see Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *14-15; Reed, 575 F.3d at
916; Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 296 n.27 (1st Cir. 1997). The Act thus
protects only the substance of communications intentionally communicated from
one person to another, “such as the words spoken in a phone call.” In re iPhone
Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“iPhone II”). It
does not protect transactional information, such as a party’s identity, when or
6 Even if considered, the allegations are nonsensical. The exception applies
where the interception is undertaken to enable further tortious or criminal
conduct, such as blackmail. Plaintiffs contend that placing cookies itself
constitutes a CFAA-like violation, not that placing cookies somehow enables
Google to violate the CFAA. See infra at pp. 33-37.
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where the communications took place, or the length of the communications. See,
e.g., Sams v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 10-5897, 2011 WL 1884633, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal.
May 18, 2011) (Act does not cover records identifying person using Yahoo ID and
email address, IP addresses, and login times); Jessup-Morgan v. Am. Online, Inc.,
20 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (identity of user not covered); Reed,
575 F.3d at 916 (time of origination, duration, source, and destination of telephone
call not covered); Gilday, 124 F.3d at 296 n.27 (Act does not cover “the PIN of [a]
caller, the number called, and the date, time[,] and length of the call”).
In the Internet context, “personally identifiable information that is
automatically generated by the communication” is not “‘contents’ for the purpose
of the Wiretap Act.” Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *15-16;
iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1061-62 (data conveying geolocation of iPhone users
not covered by the Wiretap Act); In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435-
36 (E.D. Va. 2011) (Act does not cover IP numbers, Twitter subscriber, user, and
screen names, e-mail addresses, telephone and instrument numbers, subscriber
numbers and identities, and temporarily assigned network addresses).
Plaintiffs have not alleged that contents of communications were intercepted
as a result of Google’s placement of the Doubleclick cookie, the only
“interceptions” even potentially at issue. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 137-38 (“Google
intentionally intercepted the contents of electronic communications . . . through
Case 2:12-cv-07829-SRC-CLW   Document 44-1   Filed 01/15/14   Page 31 of 50 PageID: 370
22
Google’s use of devices that tracked and recorded the Plaintiffs’ web
communications,” namely “Google’s DoubleClick.net cookies”); id. ¶ 155
(“Google used the cookies” “to intercept[] the Plaintiffs’ communications with the
Viacom children’s websites”). Plaintiffs’ browsers send GET commands even in
the absence of any cookies; Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege that Google
“intercepted” any new or different information due to the presence of the
DoubleClick cookie. See id. ¶¶ 24-31, 39-44, 78, 80, 139-40; Cookie Litig., 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *15 (“plaintiffs’ browsers voluntarily sent to Google
the information inputted by plaintiffs, regardless of whether plaintiffs’ browsers
had any Google cookies set”); id. at *16 (“With respect to URLs, it is important to
note that plaintiffs’ browsers would send a URL regardless of whether a third party
cookie was set.”).
Thus, the only information that would not have been communicated to
Google but for the placement of the cookie is the cookie’s value. See Compl.
¶¶ 45, 47-48. But cookie value is merely an “alphanumeric identifier” unrelated to
the communication it accompanies. See id. ¶¶ 47, 98; DoubleClick, 154 Supp. 2d
at 513 (cookie id number is “meaningless to anyone” other than Google). Because
it conveys no information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of
Plaintiffs’ communications, the cookie value is not protected “contents.”
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3. Because There Was No Unlawful Interception, Plaintiffs
Cannot State Use And Disclosure Claims
Plaintiffs make vague and conclusory allegations that Google “disclosed”
and “used” unlawfully intercepted communications. See Compl. ¶ 159. Those
conclusory allegations, devoid of specific facts, are properly disregarded. In any
event, because Plaintiffs cannot show any unlawful interception, they cannot show
an unlawful disclosure or use. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d) (creating liability only
for use and disclosure of information “obtained in violation of this subsection”).7
C. The California Invasion of Privacy Act Claim Should Be
Dismissed (Count IV)
Plaintiffs cannot state a California Invasion of Privacy Act, Penal Code
§ 631 (“CIPA”) claim for the same reasons they cannot state a Wiretap Act claim.
They cannot show that Google “in any unauthorized manner,” intercepted, used,
or disclosed the “contents or meaning” of a “communication” that is “in transit.”8
Id. § 631(a); Compl. ¶ 176. In particular:
7 See also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 216 F.3d 621, 625
(7th Cir. 2000); Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 1971);
Buckingham v. Gailor, No. 00-1568, 2001 WL 34036325, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 27,
2001), aff’d, 20 F. App’x 243 (4th Cir. 2001); Betancourt v. Nippy, Inc., 137 F.
Supp. 2d 27, 31-32 (D.P.R. 2001); Simmons v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp.
392, 396-97 (W.D. Okla. 1978), aff’d, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
8 Even if Plaintiffs could allege a claim, it would be preempted by the federal
Wiretap Act. In re Google Inc. St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d
1067, 1084-85 (N.D. Cal. 2011); LaCourt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50543, at *7;
(continued...)
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(1) Google was an authorized party to the communication. Membrila v.
Receivables Performance Mgmt., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33565, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 6, 2010) (“Section 631 . . . applies only to eavesdropping by a third party
and not to recording by a participant to a conversation.”); In re Facebook Privacy
Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (N.D. Cal. 2011); and
(2) Plaintiffs fail to allege the interception of the content of a protected
communication. Cal. Pen. Code § 631(a); Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145727, at *19 (substantively identical “allegations d[id] not demonstrate that
Google intercepted any ‘contents or meaning.’”); People v. Suite, 161 Cal. Rptr.
825, 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (obtaining telephone numbers of callers does not
reveal contents of communications).
D. The Stored Communications Act Claim (Count III) Should Be
Dismissed
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) renders liable whoever “(1)
intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to
access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.”
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (emphasis added).
(...continued from previous page)
Bunnell v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1154-55 (C.D.
Cal. 2007).
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1. Plaintiffs Cannot Identify A Communication In Electronic
Storage
Plaintiffs’ SCA claim is irreconcilable with their Wiretap Act claim.
Plaintiffs contend that Google improperly accessed electronic communications
from their “web browsers” and “computing devices” (Compl. ¶¶170, 173), but the
only such communications they identify are the GET requests Plaintiffs’ browsers
send to Google. Id. ¶¶ 24-31, 39-44, 78, 80, 139-140. Plaintiffs go to great lengths
to show that these communications were “in transit” and accessed
“contemporaneously with the Plaintiffs’ communications,” e.g., Id,¶¶ 30, 145, as
required by the Wiretap Act, see Fraser, 352 F.3d at 113. Those allegations
preclude the SCA claim—which requires communications to be accessed while in
“electronic storage.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a); see Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop
Slazenger Grp. Am., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 430, 438 (D. Del 2003) (plaintiffs “may
plead alternative theories of relief based on the same set of facts,” but may not
plead inconsistent facts). Because communications cannot simultaneously be “in
transit” and in “storage,” Plaintiffs’ SCA claim fails. Fraser, 352 F.3d at 114.
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Identify A Facility Under The SCA
The lack of an SCA-covered “facility” is also fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim. E.g.,
Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *26-27. Congress enacted the
SCA out of concern that the Fourth Amendment might not protect against searches
and seizures of electronic communications stored by third party communications
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services, and therefore sought to fill that gap by protecting against unauthorized
access when they were in such hands. Id. at *20-21. Thus, the “facilities” the
SCA covers are those of “providers of a communication service such as telephone
companies, Internet or e-mail service providers, and bulletin board services.”
Garcia v. City of Laredo, 702 F.3d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 2012). While Plaintiffs
recite the words of the statute in claiming that their personal computing devices
(and by extension web browsers) are SCA “facilities” (Compl. ¶¶ 169, 171), courts
have overwhelmingly (and rightly) rejected that nonsensical interpretation. See
Garcia, 702 F.3d at 792-93; Morgan v. Preston, No. 3:13-00403, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 159641, at 14 & n.3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2013) (“the overwhelming body
of law” holds that an individual’s personal computer is not a ‘facility’”); Cookie
Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *24.
Plaintiffs’ interpretation would “render other parts of the statute illogical.”
iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. If Plaintiffs were right and their personal
computers were “facilities,” then § 2701(c) would permit Internet and email
service providers to “grant access to a user’s computer (the ‘facility’).” Id. “‘It
would certainly seem odd that the provider of a communication service could grant
access to one’s home computer to third parties, but that would be the result of
[plaintiff’s] argument.’” Id. (citation omitted)); see also Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S.
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Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *23 (this interpretation “confounds the distinction between
‘users’ and ‘providers’ which, in turn . . . [makes] . . . § 2701(c) nonsensical”).
3. Plaintiffs Cannot Show That Google’s Access Was
Unauthorized
Plaintiffs also cannot show that Google’s access to its own cookies was
unauthorized. Years ago, the DoubleClick court dismissed plaintiffs’ SCA claim
on this basis, holding that DoubleClick was authorized to access its cookies. 154
F. Supp. 2d at 513-14. What was true then remains so today. Moreover, Plaintiffs
authorized access because their browsers voluntarily sent cookie values to Google.
E. The Video Privacy Protection Act Claim (Count I) Should Be
Dismissed
Plaintiffs’ claim under the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) must be
dismissed. The VPPA was enacted in 1988 after the City Paper published a list of
videos that Supreme Court nominee Judge Robert Bork had rented from a video
store. See S. Rep. 599, 2nd Sess., at 5 (Oct. 5, 1988). Congress thus passed the
VPPA to govern the circumstances in which a “video tape service provider” (or
“VTSP”) may disclose “personally identifiable information” to third-parties (18
U.S.C. § 2710(b)) and for how long the VTSP may retain it (18 U.S.C. § 2710(e)).
1. Plaintiffs Fail To Plead A Disclosure Claim
The VPPA prohibits (1) a VTSP (2) from “knowingly disclos[ing] to any
person” (3) personally identifiable information (“PII”) (4) “concerning any
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consumer of such provider,” unless an exception applies. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3),
(a)(4), (b)(1), (b)(2). Plaintiffs fail to plead a viable disclosure claim.
i. Google Is Not A VTSP
A VTSP is a “person, engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or
similar audio visual materials.” Id. § 2710(a)(4). Plaintiffs cannot allege that
Google satisfies this definition, and they do not even try. See Compl. ¶ 126 (only
attempting to plead facts establishing that Viacom satisfies definition). While
Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is far from clear, they apparently contend Google
satisfies the alternate definition of a VTSP: an “entity to whom a disclosure is
made” by another VTSP. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4) (emphasis added);
§2710(b)(2)(D) & (E). Plaintiffs claim Google “obtain[ed] Plaintiffs’ personally
identifiable information in the form of the specific video materials and services
requested and obtained . . . from Viacom.” Compl. ¶ 129 (emphasis added).
Even if Viacom were a VTSP, Google is not an entity to whom a disclosure
was made by another VTSP because Viacom did not disclose PII to Google, i.e.,
“information which identifies [Plaintiffs] as having requested or obtained specific
video materials from [Viacom].” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). If PII were disclosed to
Google (which it was not), it would have been disclosed by Plaintiffs themselves,
not by Viacom. Plaintiffs admit this. They allege that the URLs they “typed into
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and sent through their web browsers” identify the videos they requested and
received from Viacom. Compl. ¶¶ 139-40; see also id. ¶¶ 78, 80. As discussed
above (see supra pp. 7-9, 17-20), Plaintiffs voluntarily transmit the URLs to
Google as part of their GET command requesting ad content. See Cookie Litig.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *16. Thus, even if the exact titles of videos
viewed by Plaintiffs were disclosed (which they were not), they were disclosed to
Google by Plaintiffs, not by Viacom. Google is therefore not a VTSP and cannot
be held liable under the VPPA.9 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).
ii. Google Did Not Disclose Plaintiffs’ PII
Plaintiffs’ VPPA claim also fails because they do not allege Google
knowingly disclosed PII to any third party. Compl. ¶¶129-130 (alleging that
Google “obtain[ed]” PII, but not alleging that Google disclosed it); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710(b)(1); Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-01629, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116497, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012). In Rodriguez v. Sony Computer Entm’t
9 To the extent Dirkes v. Borough of Runnemede can be read to say that “any
person” can violate the disclosure provisions of the VPPA, not just a VTSP, it
was wrongly decided. 936 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1996). That is so for at least
three reasons: (1) such an interpretation ignores the plain statutory language that
only a VTSP can violate the disclosure restrictions, Daniel v. Cantrell, 375 F.3d
377, 383 (6th Cir. 2004); see § 2710(b)(1); (2) it would render Congress’ detailed
definition of a VTSP superfluous, Daniel, 375 F.3d at 383; and (3) such an
expansive prohibition against disclosure would act as a prior restraint of speech,
thereby raising serious constitutional questions, ACLU v. Holder, 652 F. Supp. 2d
654, 669 (E.D. Va. 2009).
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Am. LLC, the court dismissed a VPPA claim against Sony because “plaintiff’s
allegations fail to state that a disclosure has affirmatively taken place, identify with
particularity the person(s) or entity to whom such disclosure was made, or state
that any such disclosure falls outside the scope of disclosures permitted under the
VPPA.” 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55959, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012). For the
same reasons, Plaintiffs’ disclosure claim should be dismissed.10
2. Plaintiffs Fail To Plead A Failure To Destroy Claim
Plaintiffs also allege that Google violated 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e), which
requires the destruction of old PII. See Compl. ¶ 131. As with their disclosure
claim, this claim fails because (1) Google is not a VTSP, and (2) it never collected
10 Plaintiffs’ claim also fails because they do not allege facts to demonstrate
that PII was ever disclosed to Google. PII is defined as “information which
identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials from”
a VTSP. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3). Plaintiffs allege that the URLs of the Viacom
websites they visited constitute PII. Compl. ¶¶ 78, 80, 129-30, 139-40. But the
only URL they cite, which they claim “identifies the exact title of the video the
user has requested and received,” provides no such information. See id. ¶¶ 80,
78, 140 (discussing http://www.nick.com/shows/penguins-of-madagascar). To
the contrary, the URL directs a browser to a webpage containing a variety of
games, videos, and information related to a television series called “The Penguins
of Madagascar.” This webpage is properly considered here because it is
incorporated by reference into the complaint. See, e.g., Edelman v. Croonquist,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43399, at *4, n.1 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010). Even if the URL
were disclosed to Google, it does not identify (1) a person, as (2) having
requested or obtained any video, let alone “specific video materials.” See
Gonzalez v. Cent. Elec. Coop., Inc., No. 08-6240, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98104,
at *33 (D. Ore. Oct. 15, 2009) (no VPPA violation where VTSP disclosed that the
customer rented a video, without identifying the specific video). It is not PII.
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PII, and therefore could not violate any requirement to destroy PII. The claim also
fails because (3) there is no VPPA cause of action for failure to destroy PII, and (4)
Plaintiffs have pleaded no facts to support a failure to destroy claim.
i. There Is No Private Right of Action
Based on the text, structure, and purpose of the VPPA, nearly every court to
have considered whether § 2710(e), titled “Destruction of Old Records,” provides a
private right of action agrees that it does not. See Daniel, 375 F.3d at 384-85;
Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
no private cause of action for damages for violation of § 2710(e)); Rodriguez v.
Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55959, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 20, 2012) (currently on appeal).
The VPPA’s plain language compels this interpretation. While § 2710(b)(1)
indicates that a VTSP “shall be liable” for violating the disclosure rule, § 2710(e)
contains no similar language concerning a violation of the destruction rule.
Moreover, § 2710(c), which discusses the requirements for bringing a “civil
action,” immediately follows the disclosure provisions of § 2710(b), while
§ 2710(e) falls two sections below (c). If Congress intended (e) to provide a basis
for liability, “it would make sense that the section on civil actions would come at
the end of the statute.” Daniel, 375 F.3d at 384.
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A private cause of action only for disclosure claims is also consistent with
Congressional intent to provide a remedy only to plaintiffs who are “aggrieved.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(1). An “aggrieved” person is one who is injured. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 33 (6th ed. 1990) (“aggrieved” means “having suffered
loss or injury”; “injured”). No plaintiff could be injured by the retention of PII,
unless it had been wrongfully disclosed. As Judge Posner explained, “[i]f, though
not timely destroyed, [PII] remained secreted in the video service provider’s files
until it was destroyed, there would be no injury.” Sterk, 672 F.3d at 538.11
Here, § 2710(c)—which authorizes a private cause of action for damages
and equitable relief—“is limited to enforcing the prohibition of disclosure.” Sterk,
672 F.3d at 538. Thus, Plaintiffs’ § 2710(e) claim should be dismissed.
ii. Google Did Not Retain PII Longer Than Necessary
Plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed for the additional reason that they do
not plead facts supporting an allegation that Google retained Plaintiffs’ PII more
“than one year from the date the information is no longer necessary for the
11 Lack of a cause of action does not make the destruction requirements of
§ 2710(e) meaningless. “If the failure to timely destroy such records resulted in
harm to the consumer [such as disclosure to a third-party], he could presumably
bring a negligence action against the VTSP and benefit from the existence of
section (e) by arguing negligence per se.” Daniel, 375 F.3d at 384 n.5.
Case 2:12-cv-07829-SRC-CLW   Document 44-1   Filed 01/15/14   Page 42 of 50 PageID: 381
33
purpose for which it was collected.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Nor could they make such an allegation consistent with their Rule 11 obligations.
F. The New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act Claim Should
Be Dismissed (Count V)
To state a New Jersey Computer Related Offenses Act (“CROA”) claim,
Plaintiffs must allege Google (1) “damaged [Plaintiffs] in business or property,”
by (2) engaging in enumerated conduct. N.J.S.A. § 2A:38A-3. These claims
“mirror” claims under § 502 of the California Penal Code (the “CCL”) (Joseph
Oat Holdings, Inc. v. RCM Digesters, Inc., 409 F. App’x 498, 504 (3d Cir. 2010))
and are “similar” to CFAA claims (Mu Sigma, Inc. v. Affine, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99538, at *30 (D.N.J. July 17, 2013)).12 The CROA has never been
applied to ordinary Internet activity of the type Plaintiffs challenge here. Claims
12 The CCL and CFAA are essentially coextensive. See Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Both were enacted to
combat computer hackers and malicious viruses, not ordinary commercial
activity. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201, 207
(4th Cir. 2012) (“[C]ourts should not . . . transform[] a statute meant to target
hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to [defendants] who access computers
or information in bad faith.”); United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857-58 (9th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (CFAA is an “anti-hacking statute,” not “a sweeping
Internet-policing mandate”); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147345, at *14 & n.8 (CCL not aimed at abuse of a “standard web
browser function”); Integral Dev. Corp. v. Tolat, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153705,
at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (describing CFAA and CCL as “anti-hacking
statutes.”). The CROA should be interpreted through the lens of that same policy
objective. See Joseph Oat Holdings, 409 F. App’x. at 503, 504, 506 (describing
the CROA as an “anti-hacking statute”).
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challenging such conduct have been repeatedly rejected under both the CCL and
CFAA. See, e.g., Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *27-32; In re
iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *33-41 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2011); In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42724, at *21-24, *33-37 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013).
1. Google Did Not Damage Plaintiffs in Business or Property
Plaintiffs do not allege that they suffered any Article III injury (supra pp.
11-15), much less that Google “damaged [them] in business or property.” The
CROA damage requirement should be construed as the CFAA’s parallel
“damage” and “loss” provisions, which establish injury requirements more
stringent than Article III.13 Plaintiffs’ generalized allegations about the value of
personal information allegedly collected by Google do not meet the
requirement.14
13 See Mintel Int’l Grp., Ltd. v. Neergheen, No. 08-cv-3939, 2010 WL 145786,
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2010) (“damage” under CFAA limited to “situations in
which data is lost or impaired because it was erased or otherwise destroyed, or in
which computer networks or databases are disabled”); iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d
at 1067 (“loss” under CFAA limited to “to the traditional computer ‘hacker’
scenario-where the hacker deletes information, infects computers, or crashes
networks”); Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 935 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“Only ‘economic damages’ qualify as ‘losses’ under the CFAA.”).
14 Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *28 (“[P]laintiffs have not
shown individual economic loss”); DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525
(Plaintiffs “have not pled that DoubleClick caused any damage whatsoever to
(continued...)
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2. Google Did not Purposefully or Knowingly Harm Plaintiffs
“[E]ach subsection [of the CROA] requires that the conduct by [Google] be
purposeful or knowing.” Fairway Dodge, Inc. v. Decker Dodge, Inc., 191 N.J.
460, 469 (2007). Accordingly, Plaintiffs must plead facts showing that Google
purposefully or knowingly damaged Plaintiffs in business or property; merely
alleging that Google engaged in purposeful conduct is insufficient. Such an
interpretation is consistent with the similar requirements of the CFAA.15 Here,
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this element because their allegations confirm Google’s
purpose in using cookies was to deliver tailored ads, not to harm Plaintiffs’
business or property. See supra at pp. 9-10; DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
(...continued from previous page)
plaintiffs’ computers, systems or data that could require economic remedy.”);
Bose v. Interclick, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93663, at *15 (“The collection of
demographic information does not constitute damage to consumers . . .”).
Plaintiffs’ failure to plead any cognizable “damage” defeats their CROA claim.
Fairway Dodge, Inc. v. Decker Dodge, Inc., 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
1360, at *28 (App. Div. June 12, 2006) (“[L]iability is established only if
[plaintiff] has been damaged in business or property.”).
15 See Kalow & Springnut, LLP v. Commence Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48036, at *9 (D.N.J. June 23, 2008) (“alleg[ation] that [defendant] intentionally
transmitted a software code to [plaintiff]’s computer system and that, the software
code . . . caused damage to them” insufficient to plead intentional harm under the
CFAA); Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 734 F. Supp. 2d 956, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“[P]laintiffs must allege and prove that [the defendant] specifically ‘intended’ to
‘cause damage’”).
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3. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy the Remaining Elements
Required for the Subsections of the CROA
Plaintiffs do not allege facts to satisfy any of the CROA’s subsections:
 CROA subsections 3(a)-(b). Plaintiffs do not allege a subsection 3(a)-
(b) claim because Google merely communicated with their browsers as the
browsers were designed to communicate, without causing any alteration, damage,
or taking. The only data Google obtained by placing cookies on Plaintiffs’
browsers was data it had permission to access: its cookie values. See supra at pp.
20-22; PNC Mortg. v. Superior Mortg. Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25238, at
*14 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2012) (dismissing CROA claim;“there are no facts that show
that any data or information was taken. . .”); P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the
Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 2005) (same).
 CROA subsection 3(c). Plaintiffs cannot state a subsection 3(c) claim
because they cannot show that Google engaged in unauthorized access. First,
Plaintiffs voluntarily sent GET commands to Google. Second, the only data
Google obtained by placing cookies on Plaintiffs’ browsers were the values of
Google’s own cookies. Third, Plaintiffs fail to plead facts supporting an inference
that Google hacked their computers. The term “access” is defined by section
2A:38A-1(a) “in terms redolent of ‘hacking’ or breaking into a computer,” which
“is different from the ordinary, everyday use of a computer.” Chrisman v. City of
Los Angeles, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 701, 704-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007);16 see also Joseph
Oat Holdings, 409 F. App’x. at 503, 504, 506 (describing the CROA as an “anti-
hacking statute”); P.C. Yonkers, F.3d 428 at 509 (finding that the CROA
“require[s] proof of some activity vis-a-vis the information other than simply
gaining access to it”). Because Google was authorized to communicate with
16 While Chrisman interpreted the CCL, the CROA defines the term “access”
similarly and should therefore be interpreted similarly. Compare N.J. Stat. §
2A:38A-1(a) (“‘Access’ means to instruct, communicate with, store data in,
retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer,
computer system, or computer network.”) with Cal. Pen. Code § 502(b)(1)
(“‘Access’ means to gain entry to, instruct, or communicate with the logical,
arithmetical, or memory function resources of a computer, computer system, or
computer network.”); see also supra p. 33 & n.12; Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.,
544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
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Plaintiffs’ browsers, see supra pp. 17-20, 27, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support
an inference of hacking.
 CROA subsection 3(d). Subsection (d) is inapplicable to Plaintiffs’
allegations because it only applies to “financial instrument[s].”
 CROA subsections 3(e). Plaintiffs’ subsection (e) claim fails because,
as discussed above, they do not plead facts that Google hacked their computers.
G. The Intrusion Claim (Count VI) Should Be Dismissed
Plaintiffs do not specify whether their intrusion claim (Count VI) is based on
California or New Jersey law.17 Compl. ¶¶ 194-97. Regardless, the claim fails
because Plaintiffs have not alleged that Google (1) intentionally (2) invaded a
legally private matter (3) in a manner “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 129 N.J. 81, 94-95 (1992) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B (1977)); Folgelstrom v. Lamps Plus, Inc.,
195 Cal. App. 4th 986, 992 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (same).
1. Google Lacked the Requisite Intent
First, Plaintiffs do not allege Google had the requisite intent. “[A]n actor
commits an intentional intrusion only if he believes, or is substantially certain, that
he lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the intrusive act.”
17 This omission alone warrants dismissal. Cf. In re Ductile Iron Pipe Fittings
(DIPF) Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-169, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
142466, at *25 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2013) (“DIPF Litig.”). Despite this failing,
however, it is possible to evaluate (and reject) Plaintiffs’ intrusion claim because,
as explained supra, California and New Jersey law are consonant in this area.
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O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989); accord Dubbs v.
Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs do not allege
Google knew it was violating the law by placing cookies on their browsers (and it
was not). Google’s intent “has plainly not been to perpetuate torts” but to “make
money by providing a valued service.” DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
2. Google Did not Invade a Legally Private Matter
Second, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Google invaded a private matter. The
communications between Plaintiffs’ browsers and the websites were not “private”:
Google was party to them and would have been regardless of the cookies. Supra at
pp. 7-9, 17-20; Cookie Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *33 (“[T]ransfer
of inputted information . . . would have occurred regardless of Google’s placement
of cookies”); see also Poltrock v. NJ Auto. Accounts Mgmt. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103351, at *18-19 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2008) (“voluntar[y] disclos[ure]” of
information “waives a plaintiff’s privacy interest entirely”). Moreover, Google
obtained no “private” information because the only additional information Google
received was the value of its cookies, which were previously known to Google.
Supra at pp. 9-10; see also Poltrock, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103351, at *12-21
(dismissing intrusion claim arising from information already known to defendant).
3. The Alleged Intrusion Was not Highly Offensive
Third, Plaintiffs fail to establish that the alleged intrusion was highly
offensive to a reasonable person. Google’s alleged receipt of information sent to it
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by Plaintiffs’ browsers and use of cookies to correlate it to display tailored ads
does not satisfy this “high bar” (Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1025), especially since
this practice is long-standing, well-known, ubiquitous, and fundamental to Internet
services. See Compl. ¶¶ 32-48; supra pp. 6-7. Not surprisingly, Cookie Litig.
reached the same conclusion concerning substantively identical allegations. 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145727, at *33-34; see also Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1025-26
(disclosure of browsing history not highly offensive); iPhone II, 844 F. Supp. 2d at
1063 (transfer of plaintiffs’ geolocation information, personal data and unique
device identifier number was not an egregious breach of social norms).
H. The Unjust Enrichment Claim Should Be Dismissed (Count VII)
The Complaint alleges an unjust enrichment claim (Count VII) without
invoking any state law. Compl. ¶¶ 198-201. This failure requires dismissal. DIPF
Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142466, at *25. Even on the merits, Plaintiffs’ claim
fails. Under California law, unjust enrichment “is not a cause of action, just a
restitution claim.” Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp., 195 Cal. App. 4th 1295, 1307 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011); Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d. at 1031. New Jersey “does not recognize unjust
enrichment as an independent tort cause of action.” Castro v. NYT Television, 370
N.J. Super. 282, 299 (App. Div. 2004). It is “a quasi-contractual claim” that is
dismissed where, as here, “Plaintiff [has not] conferred a benefit upon Defendants,
[] expected remuneration from Defendants, or . . . had a quasi-contractual
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relationship with Defendants.” Mu Sigma, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99538, at *32-
34 & n.8.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Google respectfully requests that the Complaint
be dismissed.
.
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